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This paper investigates the determinants of board compensation for a sample of Italian State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). To that purpose, we use a newly collected panel data of 106 local public utilities 
observed for the years 1994-2004, which includes detailed information on the boards of directors. 
During this period, the deregulation process inspired institutional interventions that forced utilities, 
traditionally owned by local municipalities, to change their juridical form and ownership structure, 
thereby facilitating the entrance of private investors. The corporate governance literature shows that 
such changes may exacerbate the agency conflicts between shareholders, top executives and the 
board. However, board compensation could reduce the agency costs by aligning the incentives of  
managers with the interests of shareholders. This paper addresses this issue by investigating the 
impact that board composition, firm characteristics and performance have on board compensation. 
We find that the average board pay is negatively related to board size and positively related to firm 
dimension. The public or private nature of the major shareholder does not influence board 
compensation but the juridical form does. Finally, while the proportion of politically connected 
directors is found to negatively influence the level of per capita compensation, the impact of firm 
performance is uncertain. 
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1.  Introduction 
The remuneration of board of directors and the compensation packages of top executives are 
two corporate governance instruments designed to improve the internal control of managers and to 
provide them with the right incentives to behave in the best interests of the shareholders. The 
monitoring and advising functions of boards are jeopardized by the coordination and the agency 
problems that boards might suffer, so that providing directors with incentives by designing adequate 
remuneration schemes (in terms of both the absolute monetary value of total compensation as well as 
its appropriate mix between fixed cash salary and variable – i.e. performance related - components) 
becomes important. While CEO’s pay has been a hot topic in the economic literature during the last 
decade, board compensation as a whole has received minor attention. Also, most contributions on 
the determinants and the effects of executives compensation concern listed firms, not only for the 
availability of data and the economic relevance of such companies, but also for the increasing 
relevance that pay-for-performance and stock options components are attaining during the last 
decades. 
The private sector usually defines the best practice standard and it is almost uniform practice 
for Governments to seek to improve performance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) by emulating 
private sector practices. To that respect, in order to attract well qualified and experienced executives 
efforts must be made to include rewards in compensation schemes. However, for reasons of fairness 
and in order to avoid public controversy over unequal and excessive pay in the public sector, there 
are serious concerns about the extensive use of incentive remuneration schemes for companies 
owned by central or local governments: 
“As a general rule, Governments tend to regulate and limit the remuneration and incentive 
awards of both executives and board members of SOEs. Some countries have policies that seek to 
align pay with market rates but not be market leading. Others prescribe remuneration levels. These 
prescriptions may be supplemented by prohibitions on share options, or restrictions on bonuses” 
(Frederick, 2011, p. 21). 
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the determinants of directors’ compensation in 
SOEs. In particular, we analyse per capita board compensation in a sample of 106 Italian local public 
utilities observed over the years 1994-2004. During this period, the liberalization process was 
changing the industrial and institutional landscape of the sector. From a corporate governance point 
of view, new rules were established for the utilities’ juridical forms, ownership structure and board 
composition. Until the nineties, Italian local public utilities were traditionally firms emanating from  3
the controlling State (often local) body. From the initial status of “Azienda Municipalizzata”
1, they 
have sometimes evolved into a transitional juridical form called “Azienda Speciale”, in which 
managers enjoyed greater control over the firm’s strategy. Nowadays a large majority of Italian 
public utilities are limited companies with a proper board of directors, in which both public and 
private entities can invest, following a process labelled corporatization. The declared intention of 
such transformations was to facilitate the evolution of the sector toward a more competitive and 
market oriented organization in which local public utilities still controlled by municipal governments 
would nonetheless appear more similar to private firms in their management practices and 
objectives.  
In this perspective, it is important to analyze whether the corporate governance mechanisms 
are working in publicly owned utilities as good as they do in private companies. In this paper, we 
focus our attention on the compensation of board of directors and put it into relation with firm and 
sector characteristics such as size, profitability, ownership structure, board composition and juridical 
form. During the decade under investigation (1994-2004), most Italian public utilities were still 
controlled by state entities and their boards dominated by government representatives. For this 
reason, this paper adopts a definition of board composition that takes into account not only the 
difference between inside and outside directors and between “independent” versus “not 
independent” outsiders, but also the political connection of board members, by distinguishing them 
between “politically connected” and “non politically connected”.  
Our findings suggest that both board size and board composition matter for director’s 
compensation. In firms where boards are bigger and dominated by politicians, remunerations are 
lower. On the contrary, per capita pay increases for big firms and for utilities that take on the limited 
company form. Finally, the estimates show that there is not a clear cut relationship between 
performance and the average compensation of board of directors.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, 
that mostly concentrates on listed private firms. Section 3 explains the definitions adopted, describes 
the data set and shows some first descriptive statistics. Section 4 illustrates the econometric model 
and presents the main results of our empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Literature review 
Several studies have examined the determinants of executive compensation as well as the 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. As shown by Murphy (1999) in 
                                                 
1 This is an autonomous legal entity emanating de facto from the sovereign government, with a board of directors 
(called “Commission”) which is directly nominated by the state owner.  4
his extensive review of the literature, most empirical papers focus on the U.S. experience, on CEO’s  
pay, and use datasets which are based on samples of listed private firms. On the contrary, the 
literature on incentives schemes for board of directors (as a whole, as a function of their 
composition, and in relation to firm performance) is not well developed as yet. After the explosion of 
corporate scandals that burst over the financial markets from 2001 in the US and in Europe, 
practitioners, politicians and scholars have been much more critical in evaluating boards of directors 
as effective corporate governance instruments being able to monitor the behaviour of managers and 
to protect the interests of shareholders. Most of the literature has highlighted the importance of 
having small boards  and a relevant fraction of  independent directors. More recently, and (again) for 
listed firms only, the remuneration of boards of directors as an incentive to better control the 
management has become a relevant topic in the financial literature (Adams et al., 2010). 
 
2.1.  Managerial remuneration and firm performance 
In firms with greater growth opportunities, top managers may be affected by the moral 
hazard problem to a greater extent than in other firms and, at the same time, benefit more from the 
effort exercised in their functions. In such companies, the management frequently takes non-routine 
decisions with a long-term horizon that the board and the shareholders might find it difficult to fully 
appreciate and evaluate. Moreover, in such events the traditional accounting measures might be 
inadequate to reflect the effects of  managerial strategies. For the above reasons, a common result in 
the empirical literature is that, in order to better align managers’ and shareholders’ interests, equity-
based incentives are frequently used by bigger firms and by firms facing greater growth 
opportunities.  
The moral hazard problem affects not only the management but also the board of directors 
that must be motivated not to pursue self-interested goals in its controlling and monitoring tasks. In 
order to evaluate in an independent and objective way the quality of managerial proposals about 
investment opportunities and financial commitments, the board exercises an effort in gathering, 
developing and analyzing the relevant information. The quality of this information depends on the 
incentives the board perceives and affects the agency costs borne by shareholders. The moral hazard 
problem concerning the actions taken by the board is part of a “double agency” problem (between 
the shareholders and the board and between the board and the managers) that might be mitigated by 
suitable incentive mechanisms. 
The empirical literature has not reached conclusive results as far as the links between 
managerial (and board) compensation and firm performance are concerned. The results are mixed, 
with evidences of either a positive or negative relationship between compensation and firm  5
performance, depending on the type of remuneration considered (cash, stock, base salary, variable 
salary part) as well as on the measure of firm performance. The controversial results depend also on 
the differences between the degree of development of financial markets across countries and on the 
specificities of Anglo-Saxon governance systems vis à vis Latin and Asiatic ones. In a recent review, 
that compares the two main views about executive pay (i.e. the market-based view that sees 
compensation schemes as effective in giving managers the right incentives to maximize shareholder 
value, and the “self-serving” view, according to which high-pay managers are skimming firms’ 
profits and expropriating shareholders), Goergen and Renneboog (2011, p.1076) sum up as follows: 
“The available empirical evidence indicates that managerial self-dealing and the skimming of 
corporate profits by managers through compensation packages are tangible problems. Executive 
compensation often seems to be in conflict with shareholder value creation.” 
However, a complete analysis of the link between board compensation and firm performance 
cannot be undertaken in this paper, for at least three reasons. Firstly, we do not have detailed 
information on the different components of board compensation. Second, most of the utilities in our 
sample are not listed, so that there would be no chance for them to link board compensation to the 
stock market value. Third, Italian public utilities do not implement, or do not publicize through the 
resources we have explored, any incentive plan for their directors. On the basis of the results 
obtained by the previous literature, we will include firm performance among the determinants of 
board compensation but, in consideration of the reality of Italian public utilities, we do not expect 
any significant effect of it. 
 
2.2.   The determinants of compensation: firm size and board size 
Firm size is considered in a great number of papers as an important variable explaining 
executive compensation. The complexity of the job, the skills required, the number of hierarchical 
structures, and the ability to pay, all point towards large firms paying their directors more. Most 
sudies confirm that the salaries of executives increase with firm’s size (as measured by sales, total 
assets, or invested capital). Gabaix and Landier (2008) push the analysis forward so as to sustain that 
firm size, without any other variables, can explain almost completely the variation of the level of 
CEO’s compensation.  
The link between board size and executive compensation is uncertain. On the one hand, large 
boards of directors are likely to have a wider level of expertise. On the other hand, they can grow so 
oversized that they become ineffective in accomplishing their role of monitoring the top 
management. Relatively few papers have included board size among the regressors. Firth et al. 
(2007) have tested the hypothesis that “no relation exists between CEO pay and board size”. Since  6
their estimates on a sample of 549 listed Chinese companies observed from 1997 to 2000 show 
evidence of a negative relationship between board size and CEO’s compensation, the null hypothesis 
can be rejected, but the authors do not attempt to offer an interpretation of such an outcome.  Feng et 
al. (2007), using a sample of 136 US Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) observed in 2001, find 
that total director compensation is significantly negatively related to board size, which suggests that 
large boards are less effective in fulfilling their monitoring role. They find also that, when CEOs are 
involved in the nomination of directors, equity-based compensation of board members is less used, 
and conclude that CEOs are seeking to devise a board compensation structure that, instead of 
mitigating the agency problem, exacerbates it. In a similar vein, Ryan and Wiggings (2004), using a 
sample of 1018 US firms observed for years 1995-1997, show evidence of a negative relationship 
between board size and total director remuneration, as well as of lower shares of incentive-based 
compensation for boards who are dominated by the CEO and by insider directors. Their results 
suggest the importance of outsider and independent directors for contrasting the CEO’s power and 
for devising board compensation schemes more aligned with the interests of shareholders. 
 
2.3.  Other determinants of board compensation: composition and the role of outsiders 
Fernandes (2008) analyses in detail the role of nonexecutive board members, who are 
expected to act to protect shareholders’ interests, i.e. to bridge the gap between uninformed 
shareholders and informed executive managers. Using a sample of 51 companies listed in the 
Portuguese stock market from 2002 to 2004, he finds that firm size exerts a strong positive impact on 
top executives remuneration and that there is no clear-cut relationship between board remuneration 
and company performance. Most importantly, contrary to a priori expectations, he finds that firms 
with more non-executive board members pay higher wages to their executives and that in firms with 
zero non-executive board members shareholders’ and managers’ interests are better aligned (because 
the relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance is found to be stronger for 
such firms). The above results cast some doubts on the effectiveness of independent board members 
incentive systems and on their stated monitoring role. As stated by the author: "high compensation, 
together with the lack of a competitive labor market, suggests that there are few incentives for 
nonexecutive directors to act as honest guardians of shareholders' interests. In practice, they have 
little to gain from their assigned role and a lot to lose" (Fernandes, 2008, p. 43). 
Brick et al. (2006), using a sample of 1400 US firms observed from 1992 to 2001, highlight 
that director remuneration is positively related to the difficulty of the directors’ tasks as proxied by 
firm size. However, in the second step of their analysis they find a positive relation between CEO 
compensation and director compensation. This result could be due to the fact that large and complex  7
firms are requiring skilled managers and higher levels of effort, or it could otherwise reflect 
cronyism, where top executives are pursuing their own interests against the interests of shareholders. 
Since there was evidence of a negative link between excess compensation (the residuals from the 
pay-for-performance regression) and firm performance, they are in favour of the view that 
overcompensation of directors and CEOs is related to firm future underperformance.  
The above cited paper by Feng et al. (2007) analyzes also the link between director’s pay and 
board composition. The authors find that when the board includes more non-executive members, 
total board compensation slightly decreases but total pay to executive board members increases. This 
outcome contradicts the expectations from the agency theory (according to which the pay of   
executive board members should be negatively related to the number of non-executives, used as a 
proxy for the level of monitoring) but is in line with the above results by Fernandes (2008) and by 
Brick et al. (2006), and casts serious doubts about the real role of outside and independent directors. 
Horton et al. (2009), using a sample consisting of virtually all the UK listed companies in the 
London Stock Exchange during 2000-2007, study the relationship between executive and outside 
directors’ connectedness to social networks and their remuneration and find that network 
connectedness has the opposite effect on executives’ compensation compared to that on outside 
directors’ (who are executives in other companies) compensation. The reason is that, while 
executives are rewarded for the performance-enhancing resources that their connections bring to the 
firm, outsiders accept lower compensation for their directorship for reputational purposes, i.e. to 
signal their credibility as experts in decision control. To our purposes, the result is useful for two 
reasons: it evidences that the directors’ connections matter for their compensation and that board 
composition affects total board remuneration. In this paper, too, board compensation is put into 
relation with board composition in terms of inside, outside and independent directors, as well as 
directors exhibiting a political connection. 
 
2.4.  Ownership structure, regulation, and board pay 
Barontini and Bozzi (2011) analyze the relationship between board compensation and 
ownership structure in a sample of 215 Italian listed firms observed in the years 1995-2002. They 
find that the level of board compensation is positively and significantly affected by the size of the 
firm. Considering the nature of the ultimate owner, the level of board compensation is found to be 
higher for family firms and for widely held firms while managers of State owned companies receive 
a significantly lower compensation. This latter result can be due to the fact that State-owned firms 
are pursuing objectives other than profit maximization (for example, they may be interested in 
keeping or increasing the employment levels), so that one should expect lower levels of managerial  8
compensation and a limited use of performance-related pay schemes.  
The relationship between ownership and (executives and) board compensation is the focus of 
an increasing branch of the literature concerning newly-privatized firms. Most contribution rely on 
the Chinese experience, where the SOEs reform has implied radical changes in the mechanisms 
governing executives compensation but, according to some scholars, has failed to improve the 
corporate governance of listed firms. In Europe too, during the ‘90s, the reform waves of State-
Owned firms concentrated on privatization as a mean to solve the inefficiency of the sector. 
Nevertheless, State-Owned Enterprises remain prominent in air and rail transport, electricity, gas and 
water supply, broadcasting, natural resource extraction, banking and insurance. Most Italian public 
utilities are still state-controlled even if the liberalization had allowed the introduction of competitive 
elements in their organization and the entrance of private investors in their capital. Firth et al. (2007) 
analyze the executives compensation in Chinese listed firms and confirm that the ownership 
structure has a significant influence on CEO’s pay. In particular, Chinese firms with substantial 
government ownership and with large outside investors exhibit lower levels of CEO compensation. 
The results are particularly useful for our purposes because their paper shares some characteristics 
with ours: data on total compensation is not broken down into salary, benefits, and bonuses and there 
is no information on whether bonuses are paid. In this paper too, board compensation is measured as 
total remuneration disregarding any distinction between its components (equity, pay-for-
performance incentives, insurance, bonuses).
2 However, while Firth et al. (2007) were not able to 
identify independent directors in their sample because of data availability, and used non-executive 
directors as a close proxy for independent board members, our data set allows us to disentangle 
board composition in the categories of insiders, outsiders, independent directors, as well as 
politically connected board members.    
The already mentioned analysis by Feng et al. (2007) is relevant to our purposes because it 
refers to a sample of regulated firms, the Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in United States. 
Indeed, the literature on director compensation mainly focuses on non-regulated firms. To the extent 
that regulation is designed to protect various stakeholders’ interests, monitoring may be less 
important for regulated firms and can adversely impact governance. Specifically, the regulation on 
REITs favours the ownership concentration and reduces the threat of hostile takeovers, similarly to 
what happens in the State-Owned Enterprises considered in this paper. 
                                                 
2 In many cases, the detailed composition of board remuneration is not provided in the annual report, in particular for 
those companies that at the beginning of the sample period were in the “Azienda Municipalizzata” form and were not 
obliged to provide an accurate financial reporting. In any case, as far as bonuses are concerned, we presume that most 
firms do not have any incentives plan for their directors so that the variable part would not show up in the 
compensation.  9
More in general, regulated firms can be subject to political constraints on executive 
compensation. The regulator is concerned about both profits and consumer welfare, and tries to 
influence executive pay in order to avoid excessive lump-sum payouts that will be against prevailing 
public sentiment. Consistently with the above arguments, Joskow et al. (1996) find, for a sample of 
87 US state-regulated private utilities observed during 1978-1990, that CEOs of regulated firms earn 
less than their unregulated counterparts and have a compensation scheme that is less tied to firm 
profitability. 
Since we are working on a sample of State Owned local public utilities, we do not expect to 
find board compensation levels which are strongly related to company performance. Moreover, 
following the above discussion, we expect also that the presence of politically connected directors in 




3.  Data set and definitions 
3.1. Definitions 
Board is the number of directors sitting on the board. Board composition is defined according 
to the political affiliation, the independence, the status of insider or outsider of each director. 
Politically connected directors may be identified by their present or past activity in the political 
arena, as represented by a political charge, the membership to a political party, the candidacy for 
election. We consider as politically connected directors holding a seat in the parliament or in the 
Municipal, Provincial or Regional government at the same time as a seat in the board or before, or, 
more generally, directors affiliated to a political party and whose relationship with political parties is 
well known. 
We define as outside directors board members who are not current employees of the firm, so 
that they might also cover one of the top positions, typically the President, if they have no executive 
powers. Outside directors are not qualified on the basis of their inside stock ownership because most 
of the Italian public utilities are totally owned by a local or central government and the category is 
irrelevant. 
Independent directors are detected by relying on the “Codice di autodisciplina” issued by the 
Committee for corporate governance of listed firms of the Italian Stock Exchange: “A convenient 
proportion of non executive directors is represented by independent directors, who must not be 
involved in any economic relationship with the firm, its executive directors and its shareholders, 
                                                 
3 For an extensive review of the literature focusing on politically connected firms, see Menozzi et al. (2011).  10
cannot execute control or relevant influence over the firm and are not relatives of anyone in such a 
positions (page 21).” Therefore, board members are considered as independent if they do not exhibit 
any supplier, customer, interlocking, or potential competitor relationships with the firm. Listed 
companies in the sample must clearly state if their directors are independent or not according to the 
“Codice di autodisciplina” and sometimes non-listed companies do the same in their balance sheet 
or chart. We fill the missing information for non-listed companies by applying the same criterion to 
their directors. Some directors are said to be independent even if they act as officers in the public 
entity controlling the firm. In these cases we preserve the firm’s indication and classify the director 
as (politically connected and) independent. 
3.2. Data set and summary statistics 
The data set includes economic, technical and governance variables of 106 Italian public 
utilities surveyed annually in 1994-2004. The majority of firms are located in the north of Italy
4, in 
particular the ones in the energy sector, which were born as “Aziende Municipalizzate” and were 
subsequently transformed into limited companies.  
Information on governance was not included in the original data and its collection makes this 
dataset unique. It includes: the juridical form, the biggest three shareholders’ identity, the board 
compensation, the name of directors, their position in the board (President or Vice President, CEO, 
non-executive director), their political connection, if any, their position as insider, outsider or 
independent directors as declared in the firm chart or deducted from their role and curriculum. 
Politically connected directors were identified by running the biographical research on the electronic 
databases FACTIVA, LEXIS-NEXIS, ABI Inform (press release) and the Who’s Who in Italy, but 
most of the information was found in the Internet. 
Table 1 summarizes some descriptive statistics for the profit ratios, the dimensional variables, 
board composition, the blockholder, that is the shareholder, normally one, owning the largest 
proportion of equity, the juridical form and the industry segment. All nominal values have been 
deflated taking year 2000 as the base-year. 
Per capita board compensation is computed as total board compensation, that includes all 
forms of compensation earned by the directors for sitting on the board including commissions, 
bonuses, compensation in kind and social security contributions, divided by the number of directors 
serving on the board. It excludes any salary, wage and related benefits due the inside directors and 
accounted for in the payrolls. Figure 1 shows that the average per capita board compensation has 
increased over time, passing from 20,541 euros in 1994 to 36,396 euros in 2004. 
                                                 
4 More precisely, 46% of the firms are located in the North-West, 34% in the North-East, 10% in the Center and 10% in 
the South and Islands.  11
Firm performance is measured by means of accounting indices (ROA, ROI and ROE). 
Market based measures of performance are not available because only 9 out of 106 firms are listed. 
ROA is computed as EBIT, earning before interest and tax expenses (which is equivalent to the 
operating profit), over total assets, ROI as EBIT over capital invested (the sum of equity and 
financial debt), and ROE as the proportion of Net Income over equity. During the sample period, 
Italian public utilities show rather low profitability rates: the average ROA equals 3.7%, while ROI 
and ROE are on average 6.9% and 6.5%, respectively. 
On average, boards are composed by less than seven persons, and sometimes all directors are 
politicians. Outside directors are as common as politicians, but most of them are not independent. 
We differentiate among three blockholders: Prblock is a dummy variable which identifies 
private blockholders, while state entities are divided between Lblock (equal to one for local 
government) and Publock (equal to one for higher levels of government, like a Province, a Region, a 
Ministry or the Central Bank). The local government (Lblock) is the most popular type of 
blockholder, followed in turn by private owners and by Regional, Provincial, and State organisms. 
The figures concerning the three juridical forms “Azienda Municipalizzata” (Azmun), 
“Azienda Speciale” (Azspec) and limited company (Corp) reflect the changes imposed to the Italian 
public utilities during the period 1994-2004. Most observations refer to limited companies, the final 
step in the evolution of the juridical form in the “corporatization” process. 
Most firms (56%) are diversified into several activities, mainly in the gas and water 
segments. The remaining firms operate in one sector only and are specialized in the water (21%), gas 
(18%) and electricity (5%) segment. 
While Table 1 highlights the dominance of politicians in the board, Table 2 shows that their 
incidence decreases as the number of independent directors goes up. A positive correlation between 
board size and firm dimension is also found. The incidence of politicians in the board is negatively 
correlated to the profit ratios and to the size variable Assets. Menozzi et al. (2011) analyze into depth 
the relationship between political connection and performance existing in Italian local public 
utilities, and find robust evidence of a negative link between %polit and ROI. This result suggests 
that, in order to fully take benefit from reforms that involved corporatization and partial privatization 
of SOEs, utilities should get rid of the influence of politically connected directors.  
Table 2 highlights that the percentage and the level of independent and outside directors are 
positively correlated with both measures of size Assets and N, the employment level. Moreover, per 
capita compensation is negatively correlated with board size and with the level and the percentage of 
politicians and outsiders. On the contrary, there is no significant correlation with independent 
directors: it seems that independent directors do not influence the level of compensation, while  12
politicians and outsiders have a depressing effect on it. This first descriptive statistics are consistent 
with the arguments developed in sections 2.2 and 2.4 about the role of board size and the role of 
political influence in shaping managerial compensation. 
Finally, as mentioned in section 2, the most consistent finding in the executive compensation 
literature is the positive relationship between pay and company size. The correlation matrix in Table 
2 suggests the same result: per capita board compensation is positively correlated with different 
measures of firm dimension: total assets, the number of employees and (not showed in Table 2) total 
revenues. We will consider these results more rigorously in a context of a multivariate analysis in the 
following section. 
4.  Empirical analysis 
Building upon previous work on the determinants of board and executive compensation, that 
mostly focused on the realm of private firms, we  estimate the following model: 
 
Per capita compit = β0 + β1sizeit + β2Git + β3Xit +λt + ηi + εit  (1) 
 
where Per capita compit is the per capita board compensation paid by firm i at time t; sizeit is a 
measure of firm size; Git is a set of governance variables concerning board composition: Board is 
the total board size, % Polit, % Indep, % Out are the percentage of politicians, independent and 
outside directors as a fraction of total board size.
5  
The regressor Xit represents a set of control variables such as the sector (Water, Electricity, 
Gas,  Multiutilities). For measuring firm size, we use a set of dummies, Small,  Medium,  Big 
indicating that a firm’s assets fall into the 30
th, 60
th or greater percentile, respectively
6; λt is a time 
dummy, ηi an individual, time invariant variable and εit the error term. 
In order to duly take into account the endogeneity problem affecting the relationship between 
board compensation and its composition, we apply the two-step GMM-sys estimation method to  
model (1). The two-step GMM-sys estimates retain the moment conditions for the in-difference 
equation by instrumenting variables in differences with variables in levels, and add new conditions 
by instrumenting variables in levels with variables in differences (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In 
                                                 
5 Table 2 shows a very high correlation between politicians and outside directors, so that we finally decided to conduct 
our empirical analysis by relying only on the shares of independent and politically connected directors. In fact, the 
inclusion all the three proportions would have been redundant and statistically not appropriate. Moreover, we have run 
regressions that consider board composition “in levels”, i.e. with Polit, the number of politicians sitting on the board, 
and Indep, the number of independent directors, as explanatory variables. The results were very similar to the ones 
reported in table 3. 
6 We used alternative measures of firm size, such as total assets (Assets), total headcount (N) or total revenues and the 
results are virtually unchanged.  13
practice, the model is treated as a system of equations, one for each time period, where the 
predetermined and endogenous variables in first-differences are instrumented with suitable lags of 
their own levels; the predetermined and endogenous variables in levels are instrumented with 
suitable lags of their own first differences. Board,  %  Polit and %  Indep are considered as 
endogenous regressors. The results of the two-step GMM-sys estimates with correction for 
heteroskedasticity of model (1) are presented in Table 3, column (1). Given the absence of second 
order correlation in the first difference of the error term, and since the difference-in-Hansen test still 
fails to reject the hypothesis that the additional moment conditions are valid, the two-step GMM-sys 
estimator may be relied on. 
The estimates reported in table 3, column (1), show that per capita board compensation is 
strongly correlated to firm dimension: small and medium firms present significant lower 
compensations than big firms (the omitted variable), confirming the results previously obtained in 
the international context. In the water sector, per capita board compensation is also significantly low 
as compared to the energy sectors (gas and electricity). The reason is twofold: on the one hand, the 
water sector has traditionally been the object of a quite strong social control due to the evident 
welfare implications of its functioning, and the level of compensation of employees and top officers 
has been moderated accordingly; on the other hand, the increase in the level of competition (and the 
associated managerial risk) in the energy sectors during the last decade has pushed the top officers 
remunerations upwards. 
The estimates show also that in Italian public utilities per capita board compensation is 
negatively related to board size, as in Feng et al. (2007), Firth et al. (2007) and Ryan and Wiggins 
(2004). Consistently with the discussion in section 2.2., it appears that also for SOEs big boards find 
it difficult to exert their monitoring role of the management.  
In addition, the results show that the presence of politically connected directors reduces the 
level of board remuneration, in line with the arguments of Feng et al. (2007) and Joskow et al. 
(1996) on the role of stakeholders who are pursuing objectives which are different from profit 
maximization, and who tend to avoid the endorsement of rich compensation packages that would be 
very unpopular and judged as excessively high by the press and the public opinion. 
The estimates confirm the absence of a significant correlation between independent directors 
and board compensation. As in Fernandes (2008), this finding casts some doubts about the 
monitoring role of non-executive directors and suggests the need for a tighter definition of 
independence.  14
In order to verify the existence of any relationship between ownership structure, board 
composition, firm performance and board compensation, as it emerges from the literature illustrated 
in Section 2, we estimate the model: 
 
Per capita compit = β0 + β1sizeit + β2G’it + β3Xit + β4perfit + λt + ηi + εit  (2) 
 
where Per capita compit is the per capita board compensation in firm i at time t; sizeit is a 
measure of firm size; G’it is a set of governance variables: Board, % Polit, and % Indep refer to 
board composition as in model (1); Azmun, Azspec and Sock, are dummy variables denoting the 
juridical forms “Azienda municipalizzata”, “Azienda speciale” and limited company, respectively; 
Publock, Lblock and Prblock, are dummy variables indicating that the major shareholder is a public 
entity like a Province, a Region or a Ministry, a local municipality or a private subject, respectively. 
The vector Xit represents a set of control variables such as the sector (Water, Electricity,  Gas, 
Multiutilities) and firm size; perfit is a measure of firm performance, alternatively ROI, ROA and 
ROE; λt is a time dummy, ηi an individual, time invariant variable and εit the error term. The results 
of the estimates of model (2) are presented in columns (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Table 3.  
The results of the estimates of model (1) about board size and composition, firm size and 
industry segment are all confirmed: per capita board compensation is negatively related to board size 
and to the incidence of politically connected directors; it is lower in small and medium firms with 
respect to big firms and in the water sector with respect to the energy and the multiutilities segments. 
While the estimates do not show any significant effect of ownership, here defined on the 
basis of the public or private nature of the major shareholder, on per capita board pay, they instead 
show a negative and significant effect of the two juridical forms “Azienda Municipalizzata” and 
“Azienda Speciale”. Therefore, firms that have undertaken the corporatization process are granting 
higher compensation levels to their boards of directors, consistent with the view that, after being 
transformed into limited responsibility companies, utilities are encouraged to hire the most qualified 
managers. This interpretation is in line with Cambini et al. (2011), who provide evidence that the 
corporatization process is bringing efficiency gains (in terms of cost reduction) for a sample of 
Italian local public transport firms observed over the years 1993-2002, and with Menozzi et al. 
(2011), who find, for a larger sample of utilities active in gas, water and electricity distribution, that  
corporatization has a positive impact on accounting measures of performance.  
Finally, consistently with expectations (see the discussion in section 2.1), we find for the 
Italian public utilities that per capita board compensation is not significantly correlated with the 
profitability ratios. This is not surprising since most Italian public utilities are not listed and stock  15
options and incentives schemes have been almost absent till now. We have run also regressions in 
which the presence of a pay-for-performance link is tested by including the interaction terms 
ROI*Prblock, ROI* % Polit and ROI* % Indep. Only ROI* % Indep shows up with a positive and 
significant sign (column 5), suggesting that the presence of independent directors has the effect of 
increasing board pay only when firm performance increases, according to the view that independent 
directors somewhat help to align the interests of managers and shareholders.
7 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Board and executive compensation represent two major components of the firm’s incentive 
structure and corporate governance. While this has been an highly debated topic with reference to 
private and listed firms, it has not been explored at all for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), in spite 
of the fact that executive compensation schemes have been the object of some important 
restructuring during the last two decades of SOE reforms in Europe and Asia. One example is the 
limit imposed to the compensation of SOEs’ directors in Italy by the budgetary law 296/2006. 
In this paper we propose to contribute to this field of studies by investigating the relationship 
between board compensation and governance mechanisms by using a sample of 106 Italian public 
utilities observed for the years 1994-2004. During this period, the liberalization process of the sector 
took place, changing the industrial and institutional environment but leaving the ownership mainly in 
the hand of the State and of the local municipalities.  
The results of our estimates confirm some important results reached in previous literature.  
Board compensation is significantly negatively related to board size, suggesting that the directors’ 
compensation structure can exacerbate the agency problem between the board and the shareholders. 
We also find that boards are better remunerated in big firms and in the energy sector with respect to 
the water sector. However, the estimates highlight that there is no discernible link between board 
compensation and company performance, confirming also for SOEs the doubts raised by Goergen 
and Renneboog (2011), who are rather skeptical about the efficaciousness of incentive pay packages 
in aligning the interests of shareholders with those of managers.  
As far as the ownership structure is concerned, the public or private nature of the major 
shareholder is not found to have an impact on board compensation. However, the juridical form 
matters, since limited companies pay their directors more than firms with more traditional juridical 
forms like “Azienda Municipalizzata” and “Azienda Speciale”.  
                                                 
7 As commented in section 2.1, since we do not have information about the different components of board 
compensation, we cannot explore into more depth the role of board composition and ownership in promoting the 
implementation of incentive remuneration schemes.  16
Turning towards the effect of board composition, we characterize directors on the basis of 
their status of insiders, outsiders, independent, as well as on their political connectedness. We find 
that the proportion of  politicians sitting in the board negatively influences the level of per capita 
compensation, which seems to suggest that the political influence within SOEs could lead to 
relation-based rather than market-based contracts, where managers and board members are typically 
political appointees with careers and pay less subject to market forces. 
Finally, independent directors are found to positively affect board pay only in 
correspondence with high performance levels, a result consistent with the view that the appointment 
of independent directors could be of some help in reducing the agency problem between managers 
and shareholders. 
It is common wisdom that SOEs are affected by the presence of multiple and potentially 
conflicting objectives, so that clear and good corporate governance practices are strongly required. 
Reforms have been introduced in order to improve the performance of local public utilities, but their 
effects could be neutralized by the activity of self-interested managers and by the presence of weak 
board of directors. Our results about the determinants of board compensation suggest that, by 
reducing the number of politicians and by increasing instead the number of (truly) independent 
directors, managers could be more motivated (or could be forced) to work in the interest of the 
shareholders (and especially to the benefit of private investors, who should be more willing to buy 
minority shares in SOEs).  
  17
Figure 1. Annual per capita board compensation 
 
Per capita board compensation per year, in euros at year 2000 values.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
  Number 
Observ.  25%  Median  75%  Mean  St. Dev 
Per capita comp (euro)  715  8993 15494 30622 28236 39275 
ROI  715  0.021  0.050 0.090 0.069 0.098 
ROA  715  0.013  0.033 0.056 0.037 0.037 
ROE  715  0.007  0.037 0.091 0.065 0.120 
Assets (’000 euro)   715  23024  63228  179306 212623 476818 
Sales (’000 euro)   715  11625 27571  85907  96910 221688 
N  715  53 164 399 385 673 
Board   715  5 7  7  6.143  2.484 
Polit   715  4 5  6  5.582  2.493 
Indep   715  0 0  2  1.418  2.099 
Out   715  4 5  6  5.013  2.454 
    Mean 
Publock  19  0.023 
Lblock  662  0.790 
Prblock  157  0.187 
Azmun  178  0.212 
Azspec  221  0.264 
Corp  439  0.254 
Gas  541  0.646 
Water  623  0.743 
Electricity  309  0.369 
Multiutilities  581  0.693 
Per capita comp is the total per capita compensation, ROI is the return on invested capital, ROA is the return on assets, 
ROE is the return on equity, Assets represents the firm total assets, Sales the revenues, N the number of employees, 
Board is the board size, Indep is the number of independent directors, Polit is the number of politically connected 
directors, Out is the number of outside directors. Publock is a dummy variable for firms whose blockholder is a State 
entity at the highest level (Ministry, Region, Province, Central Bank, etc.), while Lblock identifies firms with local 
governments as blockholders. Prblock is a dummy variable for firms whose blockholder is a private entity. Azmun, 
Azspec, Corp are dummies accounting for the juridical form (Azienda Municipalizzata, Azienda Speciale, and limited 
company, respectively). Gas,  Water,  Electricity are dummies for firms operating in at least one sector, while 
Multiutilities identifies diversified utilities who run several businesses.   19
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
  Per capita 
comp  Board  Polit  Indep  Out  % Polit  % Indep  % Out  ROA  ROI  ROE  Assets  N 
Per capita comp  1               0.050  0.029  -0.113***  0.351***  0.270*** 
Board -0.293***  1              0.008  -0.079**  -0.026  0.134***  0.115*** 
Polit -0.336***  0.915***  1           -0.065*  -0.155***  -0.057  0.068*  0.051 
Indep  -0.026  0.396***  0.270***         1          0.039  -0.021  -0.062*  0.305***  0.259*** 
Out  -0.297***  0.970***  0.913***  0.364***         1        -0.042  -0.116***  -0.035  0.134***  0.970*** 
% Polit -0.112***  -0.048  0.338***  -0.203***  -0.002  1      -0.214*** -0.292*** -0.149*** -0.126*** -0.048 
% Indep  -0.022 0.198***  0.088***  0.917***  0.189***  -0.215*** 1    0.018  -0.035 -0.055  0.241***  0.198*** 
% Out  -0.410*** 0.623***  0.591***  0.208***  0.716*** -0.048 0.213***  1  -0.025  -0.078**  0.027  0.104***  0.623*** 
Pearson correlations between board characteristics, profit ratios and measures of firm dimension: Per capita comp is the per capita board compensation, Board is the board 
size, Polit is the number of politically connected directors, Indep is the number of independent directors, Out is the number of outside directors, % Polit is the fraction of 
politically connected directors, % Indep is the fraction of independent directors, % Out is the fraction of outside directors, ROA is the return on assets, ROI is the return on 
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Table 3. Board composition and per capita compensation 
VARIABLES Dependent  variable:  Per capita comp 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Board  -2,787**  -3,508* -3,570* -3,818***  -3,226**
  (1,359)  (1,791) (1,832) (1,466)  (1,389)
% Polit  -4,656*  -2,664** -4,883** -4,108**  -2,342*
  (2,421)  (1,199) (2,915) (1,849)  (1,288)
% Indep  3,491  -26,460 -27,019 -7,419  -17,843
  (31,619)  (21,909) (21,083) (14,095)  (12,327)
Small  -18,445***  -21,428*** -21,743*** -19,506***  -17,961***
  (5,820)  (8,089) (8,333) (5,807)  (5,900)
Medium  -7,676*  -10,835 -10,992 -10,246**  -9,435*
  (4,358)  (7,514) (6,708) (5,203)  (5,191)
Water  -15,185*  -15,109* -15,084** -11,994**  -17,336**
  (7,962)  (7,879) (7,403) (5,673)  (7,571)
Gas  8,043  4,618 3,040 6,058  4,264
  (4,901)  (4,912) (4,644) (4,856)  (3,910)
Electricity  -2,822  -2,236 -2,507 -1,793  -1,895
  (5,163)  (5,007) (5,004) (4,372)  (5,230)
Multiutilities  885.8  1,310 1,628 1,774  2,140
  (6,496)  (6,011) (5,952) (4,699)  (4,386)
Azmun    -13,099* -14,158* -12,254*  -10,339*
    (7,823) (7,923) (7,188)  (5,445)
Azspec    -15,359** -15,292** -14,266**  -11,638**
    (6,247) (6,903) (5,778)  (5,478)
Publock    4,771 -226.6 7,678  6,148
    (21,873) (23,048) (18,694)  (17,309)
Prblock    -5,867 -7,339 -2,093  -4,473
    (9,386) (10,430) (8,406)  (8,047)
ROI    -648.4    -20,346
    (25,783)    (21,796)
ROA     56,184   
     (69,543)   
ROE      -16,453   
      (18,842)   
ROI* % Indep       138,132*
       (71,829)
Constant  91,189***  88,768** 90,801** 83,531***  98,874***
  (34,064)  (41,769) (40,203) (27,025)  (27,326)
AR(2) p-value  0.269  0.193 0.184 0.199  0.209
Hansen Sargan p-value  0.965  0.342 0.258 0.790  1.000
Time dummies  yes  yes yes yes  yes
Observations  715  715 715 715  715
Number of firms  106  106 106 106  106
Estimated models: GMM-sys2. Per capita comp is the total per capita compensation, Board is board size, % Indep and 
% Polit identify the percentage of independent and politically connected directors, Small and Medium are dummy 
variables identifying firms whose total assets fall in the 30
th and 60
th percentile. Gas, Water, Electricity are dummies for 
firms operating in at least one sector, while Multiutilities identifies diversified utilities who run several businesses. 
Azmun and Azspec are dummies accounting for the juridical forms Azienda Municipalizzata and Azienda Speciale, 
respectively.  Publock is a dummy variable for firms whose blockholder is a State entity at the highest level (Ministry, 
Region, Province, Central Bank, etc.), while Prblock identifies private blockholders. ROI is the return on invested 
capital, ROA is the return on assets, ROE is the return on equity, Assets represents the firm total assets. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses.   21
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